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Anoosheh Heidarzadeh, Ishan Tyagi, Srinivas Shakkottai, and Alex Sprintson
Abstract—This paper considers the problem of stabilizing
cooperative data exchange with selfish users. In this setting,
each user has a subset of packets in the ground set X , and wants
all other packets in X . The users can exchange their packets by
broadcasting coded or uncoded packets over a lossless broadcast
channel, and monetary transactions are allowed between any
pair of users. We define the utility of each user as the sum of
two sub-utility functions: (i) the difference between the total
payment received by the user and the total transmission rate
of the user, and (ii) the difference between the total number
of required packets by the user and the total payment made
by the user. A rate-vector and payment-matrix pair (r, p) is
said to stabilize the grand coalition (i.e., the set of all users)
if (r, p) is Pareto optimal over all minor coalitions (i.e., all
proper subsets of users who collectively know all packets in
X). Our goal is to design a stabilizing rate-payment pair with
minimum total sum-rate and minimum total sum-payment for
any given instance of the problem. In this work, we propose
two algorithms that find such a solution. Moreover, we show
that both algorithms maximize the sum of utility of all users
(over all solutions), and one of the algorithms also maximizes
the minimum utility among all users (over all solutions).
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, several variants of the cooperative
data exchange (CDE) problem have been studied in the
literature, see, e.g., [1]–[11]. The original setting of this
problem considers a peer-to-peer data exchange scenario over
a lossless broadcast channel. There is a group N of users
and a ground set X of packets. Each user knows a subset of
packets in X , and wants to learn the rest of packets in X .
The users exchange their packets by broadcasting coded or
uncoded versions of their packets, and the problem is to find
a solution (i.e., the transmission rate of each user and the
set of packets transmitted by each user) such that all users
achieve omniscience with minimum total sum-rate.
In this work, we revisit the CDE problem from a game-
theoretic perspective where all users are selfish. In this
setting, there can be a monetary transaction between any
pair of users, and the utility function of each user is defined
as the sum of two sub-utility functions as follows: (i) the
difference between the total payment the user receives from
other users and its transmission rate, and (ii) the difference
between the total number of packets the user wants and the
total payment it makes to other users. Thinking of the sum
of the transmission rate and the total payment being made by
each user as its cost for participating in the exchange session,
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and thinking of the sum of the number of packets each user
learns and the total payment being received by the user as
its gain due to its participation in the exchange session, the
utility function of each user is the surplus of the user.
The problem is to find a rate schedule {ri}i∈N and a
payment schedule {pi,j}i,j∈N for the grand coalition (i.e.,
the set of all users) to achieve omniscience all together
that is Pareto optimal, with respect to the utility function,
over all minor coalitions (i.e., any proper subset of users
who collectively know all packets in X). That is, a pair
({ri}i∈N , {pi,j}i,j∈N ) is a solution if there is no pair
({r˜i}i∈S , {p˜i,j}i,j∈S) for any minor coalition S to achieve
omniscience together such that the utility of some user(s) in
S is strictly greater, and the utility of no user in S is less.
Note that a solution stabilizes the grand coalition in that no
minor coalition has incentive to break the grand coalition.
The goal is to find a solution that minimizes the total sum-
rate and the total sum-payment simultaneously.
In this work, we propose two algorithms, each of which
finds a solution for any problem instance. Moreover, we show
that both algorithms maximize the sum of utility of all users
(over all solutions), and one of the algorithms also maximizes
the minimum utility among all users (over all solutions).
A. Related Work
A different coalition-game model for the CDE problem
was recently proposed in [12]. This model, however, differs
from our work in two aspects: (i) the utility function under
the consideration is different from ours, and (ii) the criteria
for the stability of the grand coalition is different from the
Pareto optimality being considered here.
Very recently, in [13], we also studied a related problem,
where each user has two utility functions: its rate and its de-
lay. Defining the stability of the grand coalition via the Pareto
optimality, with respect to both the rate and delay functions
simultaneously, over all minor coalitions, we showed that
there does not exist any non-monetary mechanism (without
the peer-to-peer payments) that stabilizes the grand coalition
for all problem instances. This result is the motivation of this
work on the design of a monetary mechanism for stabilizing
the grand coalition for any problem instance.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the original setting of the cooperative data
exchange (CDE) problem as follows. Consider a group of n
users and a set of k packets X , {x1, . . . , xk}. Let N ,
{1, . . . , n} and K , {1, . . . , k}. Initially, each user i ∈ N
1
has a subset Xi of the packets in X , and ultimately, the user
i wants the rest of the packets X i , X \ Xi. The index
set of packets in Xi for each user i is known by all other
users. Also, without loss of generality, we assume that X =
∪i∈NXi. The objective of all users is to achieve omniscience,
i.e., to learn all packets in X , via exchanging their packets
by broadcasting (coded or uncoded) packets.
A subset S of users in N is a coalition if ∪i∈SXi = X .
We refer to any coalition S ⊂ N as a minor coalition, and
refer to the coalition N as the grand coalition. Whenever we
use the notation S for a subset of users, we assume that S
is a coalition, unless explicitly noted otherwise.
Let Z+ be the set of non-negative integers. For any S ⊆
N , a rate vector r , [r1, . . . , rn] ∈ Zn+ is S-omniscience-
achieving if there exists a transmission scheme with each
user i ∈ S transmitting ri (coded or uncoded) packets
such that all users in S achieve omniscience, regardless of
transmissions of the rest of the users. Note that, for any
S-omniscience-achieving rate vector, random linear network
coding (over a sufficiently large finite field) suffices as a
transmission scheme for all users in S to achieve omni-
science (with any arbitrarily high probability) [8].
For any S ⊆ N , we denote by RS the set of all S-
omniscience-achieving rate vectors r such that ri = 0 for
all i 6∈ S. For any arbitrary subset S ⊆ N and any rate
vector r, we define the sum-rate rS ,
∑
i∈S ri and r∅ , 0.
By a standard network coding argument [8], for any S ⊆ N ,
r ∈ RS iff rS˜ ≥ |∩j∈S\S˜Xj |, for every (non-empty) S˜ ⊂ S.
We consider CDE under a monetary mechanism where
there can be a payment from any user to any other user.
For all i, j ∈ N , let pi,j ≥ 0 be the total payment from the
user i to the user j, and let pi,i = 0. For a payment matrix
p , [pi,j ], let p
+
i ,
∑
j∈N\{i} pj,i and p
−
i ,
∑
j∈N\{i} pi,j
be the total incoming payment of the user i and the total
outgoing payment of the user i, respectively.
For any S ⊆ N , we denote by PS the set of all payment
matrices p such that pi,j = 0 and pj,i = 0 for all i ∈ S,
j 6∈ S, i.e., there is no incoming payment to any user in S
from any user out of S and there is no outgoing payment
from any user in S to any user out of S. For any S ⊆ N ,
we define the sum-payment pS ,
∑
i,j∈S pi,j . Note that∑
i∈S p
+
i =
∑
i∈S p
−
i = pS for all p ∈ PS .
Definition 1 (Utility). For any S ⊆ N , any r ∈ RS , and
any p ∈ PS , the utility of each user i ∈ S is given by
ui(r, p) , (p
+
i − ri) + (|X i|−p
−
i ),
where u+i (r, p) , p
+
i − ri is the net utility due to the user
i’s contribution to the system, and u−i (r, p) , |X i|−p
−
i is
the net utility due to the system’s contribution to the user i.
Note that the cost per transmission and the value per
packet are assumed to be unity for all users.
The two functions u+i (r, p) and u
−
i (r, p) motivate the
notion of rationality defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Rationality). For any S ⊆ N , any r ∈ RS
and any p ∈ PS , the rate-payment pair (r, p) is rational if
Algorithm 1: Algo1(n, k, {Ui}ni=1, Fq)
1 N ← {1, . . . , n}, K ← {1, . . . , k}
2 ri ← 0 ∀i ∈ N , pi,j ← 0 ∀i, j ∈ N
3 l← 1, V0 ← ∅
4 while dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) < k for some i ∈ N do
5 Tl ← {i ∈ N : dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) =
maxi∈N dim(Ui ∪Vl−1)}
6 Select an arbitrary user t ∈ Tl
7 Rl ← {i ∈ N : Ut 6⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1)}
8 Select an encoding vector vl ∈ Fkq such that v
i
l = 0
∀{i ∈ K : ui 6∈ Ut} and
vl 6∈ span(∪i∈RlUi ∪ Vl−1)
9 Have the user t transmit the packet yl =
∑
i∈K v
i
lxi
10 rt ← rt + 1
11 pi,t ← pi,t + 1/|Rl| ∀i ∈ Rl
12 Vl ← Vl−1 ∪ vl
13 l← l + 1
14 end
15 return r = [ri]i∈N and p = [pi,j ]i,j∈N
u+i (r, p) ≥ 0 and u
−
i (r, p) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.
Hereafter, we focus on the rational rate-payment pairs
only, and omit the term “rational” for brevity.
We assume that all the users are selfish, i.e., each user may
or may not agree with its rate specified by a rate vector or
its payments specified by a payment matrix. The goal is to
find a rate-payment pair (r, p), r ∈ RN and p ∈ PN , under
which N is stable. We formally define the notion of stability
based on the utility function as follows.
Definition 3 (Stability). For any rate-payment pair (r, p),
r ∈ RN and p ∈ PN , N is (r, p)-stable if there is not a
rate-payment pair (r˜, p˜), r˜ ∈ RS , and p˜ ∈ PS , for some
S ⊂ N , such that
• ui(r, p) ≤ ui(r˜, p˜) for all i ∈ S, and
• ui(r, p) < ui(r˜, p˜) for some i ∈ S.
The (r, p)-stability of the grand coalition is equivalent to
the Pareto optimality of (r, p) over all minor coalitions.
Definition 4 (Feasibility). A rate-payment pair (r, p) is
feasible if N is (r, p)-stable.
Note that a feasible solution guarantees that no minor
coalition of users has incentive to break the grand coalition.
Definition 5 (Optimality). A feasible (r, p) is optimal if there
is not a feasible (r˜, p˜) such that rN > r˜N or pN > p˜N .
Note that, for an optimal solution, the sum-rate and the
sum-payment are minimum among all feasible solutions.
The problem is to determine if an optimal solution exists
for any given instance, and if so, to find such a solution.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
A. Algorithm 1
In this section, we present an algorithm that, for any given
instance, finds an optimal solution.
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The algorithm begins with an all-zero rate vector r =
[ri]i∈N and an all-zero payment matrix p = [pi,j ]i,j∈N ,
operates in rounds, and updates r and p over the rounds.
For any (uncoded) packet xi, i ∈ K , denote the (unit)
encoding vector of xi by ui , [u
1
i , . . . , u
k
i ], where u
i
i = 1
and uji = 0 for all j 6= i. For any (linearly coded) packet
yj ,
∑
i∈K v
i
jxi, where v
i
j ∈ Fq (for some finite field Fq),
denote the encoding vector of yj by vj , [v
1
j , . . . , v
k
j ].
Let Ui be the set of (unit) encoding vectors of packets in
Xi, and Vl be the set of encoding vectors of all packets being
transmitted by the end of the round l. Let V0 , ∅. We refer
to span(Ui ∪ Vl) and dim(Ui ∪ Vl) as the knowledge and
the size of knowledge of the user i at the end of the round l,
respectively, where span(V) and dim(V) denote the vector
space of (linear) span (over Fq) of a collection V of vectors
in Fkq and the dimension of span(V), respectively.
Consider an arbitrary round l > 0. Let Tl be the set of all
users i with maximum dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1). In the round l, the
algorithm first selects an arbitrary user t ∈ Tl, and then the
user t constructs (using its uncoded packets) and broadcasts
a (coded) packet yl (with encoding vector vl).
Let Rl be the set of all users i such that Ut 6⊆ span(Ui ∪
Vl−1). The encoding vector vl of the packet yl satisfies two
conditions: (i) vil = 0 ∀{i ∈ K : ui 6∈ Ut}, and (ii) vl 6∈
span(∪i∈RlUi∪Vl−1). (Such a vector vl ∈ F
k
q always exists
and it can be found in polynomial time using a randomized
or a deterministic algorithm so long as q ≥ n · k or q ≥
n, respectively [4].) Note that Rl is the set of all users i
whose knowledge at the beginning of the round l is not a
superset of (initial) knowledge of the transmitting user t, and
the encoding vector vl of the packet yl being transmitted by
the user t in the round l is not known to any user i ∈ Rl at
the beginning of the round l. Thus, the transmission of the
packet yl increases the size of knowledge of any user i ∈ Rl
by one, and it does not change that of any user i 6∈ Rl.
Next, the algorithm increments rt by 1 and increments
pi,t by 1/|Rl| for all i ∈ Rl. At the end of the round l,
the algorithm augments Vl−1 by vl, and constructs Vl, i.e.,
Vl = Vl−1 ∪ {vl}. The rounds continue until the size of
knowledge all users is k. Once the algorithm terminates, it
returns the rate vector r and the payment matrix p.
Theorem 1. The output of Algorithm 1 is optimal.
B. Algorithm 2
In this section, we present an algorithm that for any given
instance provides an optimal solution with maximum sum-
utility and maximum min-utility among all optimal solutions.
Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1, and the only
difference is in the set of users that make payments and
the update rule of the payments in each round. We assume
that there is a broker that collects the payment p−i by
each user i, and returns the payment p+i to each user i.
The algorithm begins with all-zero payment vectors p+ and
p−, and updates these vectors over the rounds as follows.
Consider an arbitrary round l > 0. Let Pl be the set of
users with maximum |Xi|−p
−
i . Assuming that the user t
Algorithm 2: Algo2(n, k, {Ui}ni=1, Fq)
1 N ← {1, . . . , n}, K ← {1, . . . , k}
2 ri ← 0, p
+
i ← 0, p
−
i ← 0 ∀i ∈ N
3 l← 1, V0 ← ∅
4 while dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) < k for some i ∈ N do
5 Tl ← {i ∈ N : dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) =
maxi∈N dim(Ui ∪Vl−1)}
6 Pl ← {i ∈ N : |Xi|−p
−
i = maxi∈N (|X i|−p
−
i )}
7 Select an arbitrary user t ∈ Tl
8 Rl ← {i ∈ N : Ut 6⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1)}
9 Select an encoding vector vl ∈ Fkq such that v
i
l = 0
∀{i ∈ K : ui 6∈ Ut} and
vl 6∈ span(∪i∈RlUi ∪ Vl−1)
10 Have the user t transmit the packet yl =
∑
i∈K v
i
lxi
11 rt ← rt + 1
12 p+t ← p
+
t + 1
13 p−i ← p
−
i + 1/|Pl| ∀i ∈ Pl
14 Vl ← Vl−1 ∪ vl
15 l← l + 1
16 end
17 return r = [ri]i∈N and p = [p
+
i , p
−
i ]i∈N
transmits in the round l, the algorithm increments p+t by 1
and increments p−i by 1/|Pl| for all i ∈ Pl.
Theorem 2. The output of Algorithm 2 is optimal. Moreover,
the output of Algorithm 2 has maximum sum-utility and
maximum min-utility among all optimal solutions.
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we reserve the notations r and p for the
outputs of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1. (r, p) is rational (i.e., p+i ≥ ri and |Xi|≥ p
−
i
for all i ∈ N ).
Proof: By the procedure of Algorithm 1, p+i = ri since
the user i receives one unit of payment for each transmission
it makes, and |Xi|≥ p
−
i since the user i pays at most one unit
for each transmission that increases its size of knowledge,
and it does not pay for any other transmission.
Let Ns be the sth subset of users that achieve omniscience
simultaneously, and let ls be the round at which the users in
Ns achieve omniscience. Note that the sets Ns are disjoint.
Denote by N (s) the set of all users in N1, . . . , Ns. Let m be
such that N (m) = N . By using similar ideas as in the proof
of [13, Lemma 4], the following result can be shown.
Lemma 2. For any s ∈ [m] and any S ⊆ N (s) such that
S ∩Ns 6= ∅, we have ls ≤ r˜S for all r˜ ∈ RS .
Proof: Fix an arbitrary s ∈ [m]. Fix an arbitrary
S ⊆ N (s) such that S ∩Ns 6= ∅, and an arbitrary r˜ ∈ RS .
Let {yl}1≤l≤ls be the set of the algorithm’s choice of packets
being transmitted from the round 1 to the round ls, and let
{vl}1≤l≤ls be the set of encoding vectors of these packets.
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For any S ⊆ N , we say that a set of packets is S-
transmittable if the encoding vector of each packet in the
set lies in span(Ui) for some i ∈ S. Let ℓ , min(r˜S , ls).
We prove by induction (on l) that, for every 1 ≤ l ≤ ℓ, there
exists an S-transmittable set of r˜S− l+1 packets such that if
they were transmitted after the transmission of all the packets
in the set {y1, . . . , yl−1}, then S achieves omniscience.
For the base case of l = 1, there exists an S-transmittable
set of r˜S packets such that if they were transmitted, then
S achieves omniscience (since r˜ ∈ RS). Next, consider an
arbitrary round l, 1 < l ≤ ℓ. Fix the set of packets Y =
{y1, . . . , yl−1}. By the induction hypothesis, there exists an
S-transmittable set of r˜S − l + 1 packets such that if they
were transmitted after the transmission of Y , then S achieves
omniscience. Let Y˜ , {y˜l, . . . , y˜r˜S} and V˜ , {v˜l, . . . , v˜r˜S}
be such a set of packets and the set of their encoding vectors,
respectively. Assume that the algorithm selects the user t,
which may or may not be in S, to transmit in the round l.
Since
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) ≥ k − r˜S + l − 1
for all i ∈ S (noting that, after the transmission of Y ∪ Y˜ ,
S achieves omniscience), and
dim(Ut ∪Vl−1) ≥ dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1)
for all i ∈ N (noting that, in the round l, the size of the
knowledge of the user t is greater than or equal to that of
any other user i ∈ N ), then
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) ≥ k − r˜S + l − 1.
If
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) = k − r˜S + l − 1,
then the user t cannot transmit in the round l since the
user t needs the set of all the packets in Y˜ so as to
achieve omniscience. This is, however, a contradiction (by
assumption). Thus,
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) > k − r˜S + l − 1,
and consequently, Y˜ contains some packet y˜ such that its
encoding vector v˜ ∈ span(Ut ∪ Vl−1). Fix such a packet y˜
and its encoding vector v˜. Note that, after the transmission of
Y ∪ Y˜ \{y˜}, the user t achieves omniscience (i.e., dim(Ut∪
Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k), and any user i ∈ S, i 6= t, needs
no more than one packet so as to achieve omniscience (i.e.,
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ≥ k − 1 for all i ∈ S, i 6= t).
(The deletion of one packet decreases the size of knowledge
of any user by at most one.)
Consider an arbitrary i ∈ S, i 6= t. We consider
two cases: (i) vl ∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}), and (ii)
vl 6∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}). In the case (i), since
vl ∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜})
and
vl ∈ span(Ut ∪ Vl−1),
then
span(Ut ∪ Vl−1) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}),
or equivalently,
span(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}).
Thus,
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ≤ dim(Ui ∪Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}),
or equivalently,
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k
since
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k.
Thus, after the transmission of Y ∪Y˜ \{y˜}, the user i achieves
omniscience. In the case (ii), since
vl 6∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜})
and
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ≥ k − 1,
then
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ {vl} ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k.
Thus, after the transmission of Y ∪ {yl} ∪ Y˜ \ {y˜}, the user
i achieves omniscience. By (i) and (ii), it follows that S
achieves omniscience after the transmission of Y ∪ {yl} ∪
Y˜ \ y˜. Thus, there exists an S-transmittable set of r˜S − l
packets Y˜ \ y˜ such that if they were transmitted after the
transmission of Y ∪ yl, then S achieves omniscience. This
completes the inductive proof.
From the above result, it follows that S achieves omni-
science by the algorithm’s choice of packets {yl}1≤l≤ℓ being
transmitted from the round 1 to the round ℓ. Now there are
two cases: (i) ls > r˜S , and (ii) ls ≤ r˜S . In the case (i),
ℓ = r˜S , and hence, all users in S must achieve omniscience
by the round ℓ (= r˜S). This is, however, a contradiction since
some user(s) in S, particularly any user in S ∩Ns, achieves
omniscience in the round ls (> ℓ) (by definition). Note that
S ∩Ns 6= ∅ (by assumption). In the case (ii), ℓ = ls, and the
lemma follows directly. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3. (r, p) is feasible (i.e., N is (r, p)-stable).
Proof: The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that
(r, p) is not feasible (i.e., N is not (r, p)-stable). Thus, there
exists r˜ ∈ RS and p˜ ∈ PS for some S ⊂ N such that
ui(r, p) ≤ ui(r˜, p˜) for all i ∈ S, and ui(r, p) < ui(r˜, p˜) for
some i ∈ S. Thus,
∑
i∈S
ui(r˜, p˜) >
∑
i∈S
ui(r, p).
Note that
∑
i∈S
ui(r˜, p˜) =
∑
i∈S
p+i −
∑
i∈S
r˜i +
∑
i∈S
|Xi|−
∑
i∈S
p−i .
Since
∑
i∈S p
+
i =
∑
i∈S p
−
i for all p ∈ PS , then
∑
i∈S
ui(r˜, p˜) =
∑
i∈S
|X i|−
∑
i∈S
r˜i.
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Since ri = p
+
i for all i ∈ N , then
∑
i∈S ri =
∑
i∈S p
+
i .
Thus, ∑
i∈S
ui(r, p) =
∑
i∈S
|Xi|−
∑
i∈S
p−i .
Putting these arguments together, we get
∑
i∈S
p−i >
∑
i∈S
r˜i. (1)
Let s ∈ [m] be such that S ⊆ N (s) and S∩Ns 6= ∅. Note that
all the users in S achieve omniscience by the round ls. By
the structure of the proposed algorithm, one unit of payment
is made in each round (each user in Rl pays 1/|Rl| units
of payment in the round l), and no user pays in any round
after it achieves omniscience (if the user i is complete at the
beginning of the round l, then i 6∈ Rl). Thus, it is easy to
see that ∑
i∈S
p−i ≤ ls.
Moreover, by the result of Lemma 2, it follows that
ls ≤
∑
i∈S
r˜i
for all r˜ ∈ RS . By combining these two inequalities, we get
∑
i∈S
p−i ≤
∑
i∈S
r˜i. (2)
By comparing (1) and (2), we arrive at a contradiction. Thus,
N is (r, p)-stable, as was to be shown.
Lemma 4 ( [4]). For any r˜ ∈ RN , we have r˜N ≥ rN .
Proof: The proof can be found in [4].
Lemma 5. (r, p) is optimal (i.e., there is not a feasible (r˜, p˜)
such that rN > r˜N or pN > p˜N ).
Proof: Consider an arbitrary feasible (r˜, p˜), r˜ ∈ RN and
p˜ ∈ PN . We shall show that r˜N ≥ rN and p˜N ≥ pN . By
Lemma 4, r˜N ≥ rN for all r˜ ∈ RN . Since (r˜, p˜) is feasible,
then (r˜, p˜) is rational. Thus, p˜+i ≥ r˜i for all i ∈ N , and
consequently, p˜N ≥ r˜N . Note that pN = rN since p
+
i = ri.
Thus, p˜N ≥ r˜N ≥ rN = pN . This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we reserve the notations r and p for the
outputs of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 6. (r, p) is rational.
Proof: Let ri(l), p
+
i (l), and p
−
i (l) be ri, p
+
i , and p
−
i
at the end of the round l − 1, respectively. Note that ri =
ri(lm + 1), p
+
i = p
+
i (lm + 1), and p
−
i = p
−
i (lm + 1). We
will show that p+i (l) ≥ ri(l) and |Xi|≥ p
−
i (l) for all i ∈ N
and all l ∈ [lm + 1]. Fix an arbitrary l ∈ [lm + 1]. By the
procedure of Algorithm 2, p+i (l) = ri(l), and particularly,
p+i = ri. We next show that |X i|≥ p
−
i (l). The proof follows
by contradiction. Suppose that |Xi|< p
−
i (l) for some i. Note
that
max
i∈N
|Xi|−p
−
i (l) = k −min
i∈N
(|Xi|+p
−
i (l)).
Thus,
Pl = {i ∈ N : |Xi|+p
−
i (l) = min
i∈N
(|Xi|+p
−
i (l))}.
By the procedure of Algorithm 2, |Xi|+p
−
i (l) are the same
for all i such that p−i (l) > 0, and |Xi|+p
−
i (l) = |Xi|≤ k
for all i such that p−i (l) = 0. Since |Xi|+p
−
i (l) > k for
some i (by assumption), then |Xi|+p
−
i (l) > k for all i, and
consequently, p−i (l) > 0 for all i (since |Xi|≤ k for all i).
Since p−i (l) is non-decreasing in l for all i, then |Xi|+p
−
i >
k for all i, or equivalently, p−i > |Xi| for all i. Thus,
∑
i∈N
p−i >
∑
i∈N
|X i|,
and consequently,
rN >
∑
i∈N
|Xi|
since ∑
i∈N
p−i =
∑
i∈N
p+i = rN .
This is, however, a contradiction since
rN ≤ min
i∈N
|X i|+max
i∈N
|X i|
(by the result of [2, Lemma 3]), and consequently,
rN ≤
∑
i∈N
|Xi|.
Thus, |Xi|≥ p
−
i (l) for all i and all l, and particularly, |X i|≥
p−i for all i. This completes the proof.
Lemma 7. (r, p) is feasible.
Proof: Take an arbitrary S such that RS 6= ∅ (i.e., all
users in S can achieve omniscience together). By the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it suffices to show
that ∑
i∈S
p−i ≤ r˜S
for all r˜ ∈ RS . Run Algorithm 2 over the set S, and
denote by (r˜, p˜) the output. Let Y˜ = {y˜1, . . . , y˜r˜S} and
V˜ = {v˜1, . . . , v˜r˜S} be the set of all packets being transmitted
from the round 1 to the round r˜S and their encoding vectors,
respectively. Note that r˜S is the minimum sum-rate that all
users in S can achieve omniscience (by Lemma 4). Assume,
without loss of generality, that |X1|≤ |X2|≤ . . . ≤ |Xn|.
Define i⋆ , mini∈S i, and S
⋆ , {i⋆, . . . , n}. Since S ⊆ S⋆,
then RS⋆ 6= ∅ (i.e., all users in S⋆ can achieve omniscience
together). Moreover, run Algorithm 2 over the set S⋆, and
denote by (r⋆, p⋆) the output. Note that p⋆S⋆ = r
⋆
S⋆ (by the
result of Lemma 6). Let Y ⋆ = {y⋆1 , . . . , y
⋆
r⋆
S⋆
} and V ⋆ =
{v⋆1 , . . . , v
⋆
r⋆
S⋆
} be the set of all packets being transmitted
from the round 1 to the round r⋆S⋆ and their encoding vectors,
respectively.
First, we show that
r⋆S⋆ ≤ r˜S .
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To do so, it suffices to show that all users in S⋆ \ S achieve
omniscience after the reception of all packets in Y˜ . The proof
follows by contradiction. Consider an arbitrary user i ∈ S⋆ \
S. Suppose that the user i does not achieve omniscience after
the reception of all packets in Y˜ , i.e., dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) < k.
Since dim(Ui) ≥ dim(Ui⋆) and dim(Ui⋆) ≥ k − r˜S , then
dim(Ui) ≥ k− r˜S . Thus, there exists some round l such that
the encoding vector v˜l of the packet y˜l being transmitted by
some user t ∈ S is in the knowledge set of the user i prior
to the round l, i.e.,
span(Ut) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v˜1, . . . , v˜l−1}),
and consequently,
span(Ut ∪ {v˜1, . . . , v˜l−1}) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v˜1, . . . , v˜l−1}).
Thus,
span(Ut ∪ V˜ ) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ V˜ ).
Since dim(Ut ∪ V˜ ) = k and dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) ≥ dim(Ut ∪ V˜ ),
then dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) = k. This is, however, a contradiction
since dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) < k (by assumption). Thus, all users in
S⋆ \S achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets
in Y˜ , and so, r⋆S⋆ ≤ r˜S .
Next, we show that
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i ≤ p
⋆
S⋆ .
If S⋆ = N , then
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i = pN = rN = r
⋆
N = p
⋆
N = p
⋆
S⋆ .
Now assume that S⋆ 6= N . If for some l, the packet y⋆l being
transmitted by the user t ∈ S⋆ does not increase the size of
knowledge of the user i ∈ N \S⋆ such that dim(Ui∪V
⋆) <
k, then
span(Ut) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v
⋆
1 , . . . , v
⋆
l−1}),
and consequently,
span(Ut ∪ {v
⋆
1 , . . . , v
⋆
l−1}) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v
⋆
1 , . . . , v
⋆
l−1}).
Thus,
span(Ut ∪ V
⋆) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ V
⋆).
Since dim(Ut∪V ⋆) = k and dim(Ui∪V ⋆) ≥ dim(Ut∪V ⋆),
then dim(Ui ∪ V
⋆) = k. This yields a contradiction since
dim(Ui ∪ V ⋆) < k (by assumption). Thus, the packet y⋆l
(for any l) increases the size of knowledge of all users in
N \ S⋆ that do not achieve omniscience after the reception
of all packets y⋆1 , . . . , y
⋆
r⋆
S⋆
.
Since the size of knowledge of each user i ∈ N \ S⋆
after the reception of all packets in Y ⋆ is min{|Xi|+r⋆S⋆ , k},
then the user i needs k − min{|Xi|+r⋆S⋆ , k} (≤ k −
min{|X1|+r⋆S⋆ , k}) more packets to achieve omniscience.
Thus, if the users in S⋆ continue to make transmis-
sions after they all achieve omniscience, all users in
N \ S⋆ achieve omniscience after the reception of at
most k − min{|X1|+r⋆S⋆ , k} more packets. Thus, all users
in N achieve omniscience with at most r⋆S⋆ + k −
min{|X1|+r⋆S⋆ , k} total transmissions. Since rN is the min-
imum sum-rate for all users in N to achieve omniscience,
then
r⋆S⋆ + k −min{|X1|+r
⋆
S⋆ , k} ≥ rN .
We consider two cases: (i) |X1|+r⋆S⋆ ≥ k, and (ii)
|X1|+r⋆S⋆ < k.
In the case (i), we have
r⋆S⋆ ≥ rN = pN ≥
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i .
In the case (ii), we have
r⋆S⋆ + k − |X1|−r
⋆
S⋆ = k − |X1|≥ rN .
Since rN ≥ k − |X1| (otherwise, the user 1 cannot
achieve omniscience), then rN = k − |X1|. Let c ,
mini∈N (|Xi|+p
−
i ). If c < |Xi⋆ |, then
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i ≤ p
⋆
S⋆
since
∑
i∈S⋆ p
−
i = 0. Now, assume that c ≥ |Xi⋆ |. Recall
that |X1|≤ |X2|≤ . . . ≤ |Xi⋆ |≤ . . . ≤ |Xn| (by assumption).
Thus, c ≥ |Xi| for all i ∈ N \ S⋆. Note that
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i = rN −
∑
i∈N\S⋆
(c− |Xi|)
and
p⋆S⋆ = r
⋆
S⋆ .
We need to show that
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i ≤ p
⋆
S⋆ .
Thus it suffices to show that
rN −
∑
i∈N\S⋆
(c− |Xi|) ≤ r
⋆
S⋆ .
The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that
rN −
∑
i∈N\S⋆
(c− |Xi|) > r
⋆
S⋆ .
Since rN = k − |X1| and r⋆S⋆ ≥ k − |Xi⋆ | (otherwise, the
user i⋆ cannot achieve omniscience), then
k − |X1|−
∑
i∈N\S⋆
(c− |Xi|) > r
⋆
S⋆ ≥ k − |Xi⋆ |,
and consequently,
|Xi⋆ |> |X1|+
∑
i∈N\S⋆
(c− |Xi|).
Since
∑
i∈N\S⋆
(c− |Xi|) = (i
⋆ − 1)c− (|X1|+ · · ·+ |Xi⋆−1|),
then
|X2|+ · · ·+ |Xi⋆ |> (i
⋆ − 1)c.
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This is, however, a contradiction since c ≥ |Xi| for all i ∈
[i⋆] (by assumption), and so,
(i⋆ − 1)c ≥ |X2|+ · · ·+ |Xi⋆ |.
Thus, ∑
i∈S⋆
p−i ≤ p
⋆
S⋆ .
Moreover, ∑
i∈S
p−i ≤
∑
i∈S⋆
p−i
since S ⊆ S⋆ (by definition). By combining the above
arguments, it then follows that
∑
i∈S
p−i ≤ r˜S ,
as was to be shown.
Lemma 8. (r, p) is optimal.
Proof: The proof follows from the same argument as in
the proof of Lemma 5, and hence omitted to avoid repetition.
Lemma 9. For any optimal (r˜, p˜), we have
∑
i∈N ui(r, p) =∑
i∈N ui(r˜, p˜) and mini∈N ui(r, p) ≥ mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜).
Proof: The proof of the first part (i.e., maximum sum-
utility) is straightforward. Take an arbitrary optimal (r˜, p˜).
Since r˜N = rN and p, p˜ ∈ PN , then
∑
i∈N
ui(r˜, p˜) =
∑
i∈N
|Xi|−r˜N =
∑
i∈N
|Xi|−rN =
∑
i∈N
ui(r, p).
For the proof of the second part (i.e., maximum min-utility),
we need to show that
min
i∈N
ui(r˜, p˜) ≤ min
i∈N
ui(r, p)
for any optimal (r˜, p˜). Take an arbitrary optimal (r˜, p˜). Since
p˜+i = r˜i (otherwise, p˜N > rN = pN since p˜
+
i ≥ r˜i
(by rationality of (r˜, p˜)), and so, (r˜, p˜) cannot be optimal),
then ui(r˜, p˜) = |X i|−p˜
−
i . Note that p˜N = pN . Let c ,
mini∈N (|Xi|+p
−
i ). Note that |Xi|−p
−
i = k− c if c ≥ |Xi|,
and |Xi|−p
−
i = |X i|= k − |Xi| if c < |Xi|. Thus,
ui(r, p) = k−max{c, |Xi|} for all i ∈ N . Since |Xn|≥ |Xi|
for all i ∈ N (by assumption), then it follows that
min
i∈N
ui(r, p) = k −max{c, |Xn|}.
We consider two cases: (i) c < |Xn|, and (ii) c ≥ |Xn|.
In the case (i), mini∈N ui(r, p) = k − |Xn|= |Xn|. If
p˜−n > 0, then
un(r˜, p˜) = |Xn|−p˜
−
n < |Xn|= min
i∈N
ui(r, p).
If p˜−n = 0, then un(r˜, p˜) = |Xn|, and consequently,
min
i∈N
ui(r˜, p˜) ≤ un(r˜, p˜) = min
i∈N
ui(r, p) = k − c.
In the case (ii), mini∈N ui(r, p) = k − c. Suppose that
mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜) > mini∈N ui(r, p). Let j ∈ N be such that
|Xj |−p˜
−
j = mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜). Thus, |Xj |−p˜
−
j > k−c. Since
|Xi|−p˜
−
i ≥ |Xj |−p˜
−
j for all i ∈ N , then |Xi|−p˜
−
i > k− c.
Thus,
∑
i∈N
|X i|−
∑
i∈N
p˜−i =
∑
i∈N
|Xi|−p˜N
=
∑
i∈N
|Xi|−r˜N
=
∑
i∈N
|Xi|−rN
= nk −
∑
i∈N
|Xi|−rN
> nk − nc,
or equivalently, (
∑
i∈N |Xi|+rN )/n < c. Since c =
mini∈N (|Xi|+p
−
i ) (by definition) and c ≥ |Xn| (by assump-
tion), then it is easy to see that c = (
∑
i∈N |Xi|+rN )/n.
This is a contradiction since (
∑
i∈N |Xi|+rN )/n < c.
Thus, mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜) ≤ mini∈N ui(r, p). This completes
the proof.
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